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INTRODUCTION 
The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)—now 78 years old—was 
born of a need to mitigate disruption to the U.S. economy caused by unfair la-
bor practices.1 In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, the United States expe-
rienced an employment climate where business owners became so focused on 
production that they lost sight of basic human dignity.2 Employers grossly mis-
treated, underpaid, and overworked laborers as a matter of course.3 Laborers 
were largely unskilled; many were illiterate, most were immigrants, and 
none—individually—had the power to effect change.4 When acting collective-
ly, however, these unskilled laborers revealed an unbridled potential to derail 
the U.S. economy.5 With enactment of the NLRA, Congress sought to regulate 
the abuses of management (and the resulting responses of united laborers) by 
providing workers with greater power to negotiate the terms and conditions of 
their employment.6 In the wake of the Industrial Revolution, such power was 
most effectively conferred through protection of the collective bargaining 
rights outlined in Section 7 of the NLRA.7 
                                                        
1  Enacted in 1935 to promote collective bargaining, the Act gave workers three significant 
rights considered essential to equalizing bargaining power between labor and management: 
(1) the right to organize; (2) the right to bargain collectively; and (3) the right to engage in 
concerted activities such as strikes and picketing. See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 
§ 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)). Enactment of 
the NLRA followed “a procession of bloody and costly strikes.” 74 CONG. REC. 2,371 
(1935) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner regarding § 7(a)). 
2  See BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 10 (5th ed. 1987). 
3  Id. 
4  Id. at 11; see also JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN 
NATIVISM 1860–1925, at 114 (paperback ed. 2002) (discussing the roles played by the un-
skilled, inexperienced European immigrants). 
5  In the summer of 1877, the United States was brought to a standstill by the Great Railroad 
Strike of 1877. This strike did not involve labor unions, but rather eighty thousand railroad 
workers joined by hundreds of thousands of other Americans—employed and unemployed. 
The strike and associated riots lasted forty-five days and resulted in the deaths of several 
hundred participants, several hundred more injuries, and millions in damages to railroad 
property. The unrest was deemed severe enough by the government that President Ruther-
ford B. Hayes intervened with federal troops. 1877: THE GRAND ARMY OF STARVATION 
(American Social History Productions, Inc. 1984), information available at 
http://ashp.cuny.edu/ashp-documentaries/eighteen-seventy-seven/ (last visited Jan. 16, 
2015). 
6  See supra text accompanying note 1. 
7  Employees have a right to engage in protected concerted activity under Section 7 of the 
NLRA which states: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent 
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as 
a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title. 
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Today’s employment climate, however, is intensely dissimilar. Disruption 
of the U.S. economy is more likely to come from failures of consumer confi-
dence8 than from striking railway workers. Every employee with a computer, 
smartphone, or social media account now has a virtual voice capable of chang-
ing the world.9 This virtual voice is a powerful tool for aggrieved workers be-
cause it provides them with the opportunity to engage in “brand-shaping” cam-
paigns. Brand-shaping campaigns seek to equalize the bargaining power 
between labor and management through viral action directed at altering con-
sumer perception of a company’s image. 
This note examines how the National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) 
dated embrace of the way employees organize and communicate their under-
standing of the world is incompatible with the realities of twenty-first century 
collective action. This note begins in Part I by exploring the conditions that 
made the NLRA necessary. Part II continues by examining the evolution of 
collective action. Part III lays out the NLRB’s framework for an acceptable so-
cial media policy. Part IV then analyzes the difficulties associated with imple-
menting such policies, and Part V concludes with a discussion of the employ-
er’s illusive protection from an employee’s opprobrious social media post. 
This note concludes that the NLRB’s insistence on applying an industrial-
era view of collective action to a digital-age employment environment is akin 
to forcing a square peg into a round hole. Such sorcery requires a reliance on a 
fact-specific, case-by-case analysis that is both unpredictable and misguided. 
The solution lies in NLRB endorsement of social media policies that clearly 
explain Section 7 rights and then separately regulate nonconforming social me-
dia conduct. Such policies should begin by outlining the right to engage in col-
lective action to improve the terms and conditions of employment, and then go 
on to designate conduct outside those limits. This solution will account for the 
inevitable conflict between an employee’s Section 7 right to communicate in-
formation that the employer seeks to shelter and the employer’s need to protect 
its brand. This solution will account for the reality of how workers today organ-
ize and express themselves. 
                                                                                                                                
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). Section 158(a)(3) provides in relevant part: “It shall be an unfair 
labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012). 
8  The 2008 “financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in confidence.” Stephane 
Dees & Pedro Soares Brinca, Consumer Confidence as a Predictor of Consumption Spend-
ing: Evidence for the United States and the Euro Area, INT’L ECON., Aug. 2013, at 1, 2 
(quoting Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz). 
9  “[S]ocial media have been heralded as the driving force behind the swift spread of revolu-
tion throughout the world . . . .” Julia Skinner, Social Media and Revolution: The Arab 
Spring and the Occupy Movement as Seen Through Three Information Studies Paradigms 3 
(Sprouts: Working Papers on Info. Sys., No. 11(169), 2011), available at http://sprouts.aisnet 
.org/11-169. 
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Where labor organizers of the twentieth century served as the primary cata-
lyst for self-organization and concerted activity, today’s aggrieved worker is 
more likely to organize and act in an online community.10 Twentieth-century 
laborers harnessed the power of collective action, through unions, to strengthen 
their negotiating position. Today’s laborers, however, are more likely to har-
ness the power of “viral action,” through social media, to strengthen their nego-
tiating position.11 The reality of viral action means that today’s employees have 
access to a communication network exponentially larger and faster than that of 
yesterday’s employees. Thus, NLRB protections of social media posts, like a 
knife that cuts both ways, can be both a blessing and a curse for the distressed 
laborer and the targeted business owner. To ensure that employer social media 
policies protect the rights of both the employer and the employee, the NLRB 
must consistently uphold policies that focus on informing employees of their 
protected Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accountable for 
brand-shaping expressions that fall outside of those rights. 
The goal, after all, is to protect the flow of commerce from the negative ef-
fects of unfair labor practices;12 the goal is not to stifle commerce with unpre-
dictable mollycoddling. 
I. THE GILDED AGE: AN EMPLOYMENT ENVIRONMENT RIPE FOR REFORM 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the United States developed into 
an industrial powerhouse.13 This era has come to be known as the Gilded 
Age,14 and it was marked by exponential industrial growth15 and the creation of 
                                                        
10  Typical protected concerted activity involves union organizing, the discussion of unionization 
among employees, or the attempt by one employee to solicit union support from another em-
ployee. But concerted activity need not involve a union. Activities by groups of employees unaf-
filiated with a union to improve their lot at their work place are deemed protected concerted ac-
tivities. 
DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, LABOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 85 (4th ed. 2000). 
11  “Like record stores and time-bound television, the labor union as an organizing device 
has outlived its usefulness: people simply don’t need intermediaries to organize them into 
groups anymore.” Tom Hayes, Will Facebook Replace Labor Unions?, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 28, 2011, 3:29 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/tom-hayes/_b_828900.html. “Social 
networking sites allow a union organizer to short circuit what in the past may have taken 
months or years of legwork.” Marissa Oberlander, An Unlikely Union: Social Media and 
Labor Relations, MEDILL REP. CHI. (Jan. 12, 2011), http://news.medill.northwestern.edu 
/chicago/news.aspx?id=176075. 
12  The purpose of the Act as stated in its preamble and evidenced by its long title is “[t]o 
diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign com-
merce.” National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)). 
13  CYNTHIA L. CLARK, THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 587 (Rev. 
ed. 2011). 
14  Id. Mark Twain coined this term to describe the “unabashed desire of the wealthy of this 
era to broadcast their status through extravagant opulence.” Opulence in the “Gilded Age”, 
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vast income inequalities.16 Entrepreneurs like Andrew Carnegie (in steel), John 
D. Rockefeller (in oil), and Cornelius Vanderbilt (in railroads) amassed incred-
ible fortunes while, at the same time, scores of immigrants lived in abject pov-
erty.17 The rampant use of unethical, exploitive, and illegal business practices 
throughout this period gave rise to many Gilded Age capitalists being branded 
as “robber barons.”18 
Although U.S. wages for some industrial workers grew 50 percent from 
1860 to 1890,19 the poorest of common laborers averaged 40 percent less in-
come than the general slum-dweller.20 More and more, increased mechaniza-
tion undercut the need for skilled labor,21 and factories became assemblages of 
unskilled laborers performing simple and repetitive tasks under the direction of 
skilled foremen.22 Many of these workers were pulled from the swarms of im-
migrants and refugees entering the country in search of a better life.23 Many 
were poor peasants and rural laborers from southern and eastern Europe who 
were qualified for little more than unskilled manual labor in mills, mines, and 
factories.24 These workers were often easy to exploit because most were illit-
erate, impoverished, and non-English speakers.25 Consequently, these laborers 
had insignificant power and inconsequential influence to alter the terms and 
conditions of their employment. 
                                                                                                                                
1890, EYEWITNESS TO HISTORY, http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/gildedage.htm (last 
visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
15  CLARK, supra note 13. 
16  Timothy Noah, The United States of Inequality, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:06 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_great_divergence/features/2010/the_un
ited_states_of_inequality/introducing_the_great_divergence.html. 
17  PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 18–20 (2007). 
18  See, e.g., Lida F. Baldwin, Unbound Old Atlantics, 100 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 679, 683 
(1907) (“We hear now on all sides the term ‘robber barons’ applied to some of the great cap-
italists. . . . ‘The old robber barons of the Middle Ages who plundered sword in hand and 
lance in rest were more honest than this new aristocracy of swindling millionaires.’ ”) (quot-
ing the August, 1870 issue of The Atlantic Monthly; writing in 1907 about how little busi-
ness had changed in thirty-five years). 
19  “The average daily wage made an estimated net over-all advance between 1860 and 1890 
of roughly 50 percent for manufacturing and 60 percent for building trades workers.” 
CLARENCE D. LONG, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, WAGES AND EARNINGS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1860–1890, at 13 (1960). 
20  HIGHAM, supra note 4, at 66. 
21  Id. at 114. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. at 65. 
24  Id. at 114. 
25  Id. at 66. 
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A. Securing Public Support 
Unfortunately for them, the political and judicial ideology of the Gilded 
Age overshadowed workers’ rights and held that freedom-of-contract principles 
justified laborers working under whatever conditions they personally negotiat-
ed and accepted.26 In truth, most of them had no choice but to accept whatever 
job they were able to find in order to provide for their families—even if it 
meant working long hours, for little pay, under conditions devoid of basic dig-
nity.27 
Take for example the story of the Triangle Waist Company, a garment fac-
tory in the heart of New York City.28 The factory workers were mostly women, 
at least one of whom was only thirteen years old, and they were largely recent 
Italian and European Jewish immigrants who had emigrated to the U.S. with 
their families in hopes of realizing the American Dream.29 Instead, they suf-
fered under crushing poverty and deplorable working conditions.30 On March 
25, 1911, 148 of the 600 laborers crammed into the upper floors of this urban 
factory lost their lives to a fire cloaked in business negligence and greed.31 
Many of the garment workers died leaping from ninth floor windows to avoid 
the searing flames.32 Later, workers who survived this tragedy reported that the 
ninth floor doors, which led to safety, were locked.33 According to the reports, 
the owners frequently locked these exit doors to prevent workers from stealing 
materials.34 
This tragedy highlights the inhumane working conditions imposed upon 
industrial workers in the years before enactment of the NLRA. “To many, its 
                                                        
26  See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 173 (1908) (“The right to purchase or to 
sell labor is part of the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth] Amendment . . . .” (quoting 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905))); Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The general right to 
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by 
the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 
578 (1897)). 
27  See, e.g., ROSE COHEN, OUT OF THE SHADOW 108–14 (1918). 
28  141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire; Trapped High Up in Washington Place 
Building; Street Strewn with Bodies; Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, at 1. 
29  Id. 
30  See id. 
31  Id. “One hundred and forty-one of them were instantly killed, either by leaps from the 
windows and down elevator shafts, or by being smothered. Seven died in the hospitals.” New 
York Fire Kills 148: Girl Victims Leap to Death from Factory, CHI. SUNDAY TRIB., Mar. 26, 
1911, at 1. 
32  New York Fire Kills 148, supra note 31; 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire, 
supra note 28. 
33  The Triangle Factory Fire: Investigation & Trial, CORNELL U., http://www.ilr.cornell.edu 
/trianglefire/story/investigationTrial.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
34  Id. 
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horrors epitomize the extremes of industrialism.”35 These exploited workers 
rightfully believed that organizing with fellow workers and speaking out about 
the terms and conditions of their employment could end in one of two ways: 
either with the loss of a desperately needed job or with management agreeing 
to inconsequential, unenforceable concessions.36 Accordingly, many Triangle 
Waist workers believed that the risk of the former did not justify the signifi-
cance of the latter, so they continued to report to work each day and to endure 
personal indignities and severe exploitation. 
Where laborers chose to organize and negotiate as a single unit, the prima-
ry method used to effect change was to strike: to withdraw all labor and cause a 
cessation of production.37 Such actions were fraught with risk and sacrifice for 
both the laborers and the employers. The laborers risked losing their jobs and 
being blacklisted from future industry employment,38 and the employers were 
forced to decide between accepting the costs of giving in to the strikers’ de-
mands or suffering the cost of the lost production.39 Because skilled workers 
were difficult to replace, they were the first groups to find success with this 
method of collective action.40 However, the absence of enforceable legislative 
protections of worker rights meant that unskilled laborers—who were easy to 
replace and exploit—had substantially less success improving the terms and 
conditions of their employment.41 
Although extreme examples like the Triangle Waist fire galvanized public 
support for labor reform,42 meaningful judicial and legislative support were still 
years away. 
                                                        
35  The Triangle Factory Fire: Introduction, CORNELL U., http://www.ilr.cornell.edu 
/trianglefire/story/introduction.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
36  “In 1909, an incident at the Triangle Factory sparked a spontaneous walkout of its 400 
employees. The Women’s Trade Union League, a progressive association of middle class 
white women, helped the young women workers picket and fence off thugs and police prov-
ocation.” The Triangle Factory Fire: Sweatshops & Strikes Before 1911, CORNELL U., 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/trianglefire/story/sweatshopsStrikes.html (last visited Oct. 18, 
2014). By 1911, though the Triangle Factory was still a non-union shop, some of its workers 
had joined the International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union. Id.; see also William Greider, 
“Who Will Protect the Working Girl?”, Introduction to LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE xi, 
xiv–xv (Centennial ed. 2011). 
37  See, e.g., Greider, supra note 36, at xiv. 
38  Id. 
39  Worse yet, labor disputes often erupted into violent riots aggravated by employer-hired 
paramilitary units, like the Pinkerton Detective Agency, used “to bust strikes—often by bust-
ing heads.” Strike at Homestead Mill: The Hated Men in Blue, AM. EXPERIENCE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carnegie/sfeature/mh_blue.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015). 
40  TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 11. 
41  Id. at 11–12.  
42  Greider, supra note 36, at xv. 
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B. Evolution of Judicial Support 
For much of the nineteenth century the courts applied an ideology that was 
overtly hostile to organized labor; in 1806, a Philadelphia court went so far as 
to convict striking workers of criminal conspiracy.43 Although this judicial 
treatment of strikers as criminal conspirators was diluted nearly forty years lat-
er in Commonwealth v. Hunt,44 the doctrine was nonetheless applied as late as 
1867.45 Ten years later, the courts began to move away from criminal sanctions 
as a means to control disgruntled workers, and began to use an approach 
gleaned from tort law: “the speedy, flexible and potent weapon of the injunc-
tion.”46 The courts began issuing injunctive relief to halt concerted activity, and 
justifying those decisions with the common-law principles of nuisance, tres-
pass, and interference with advantageous relationships.47 
This approach, as it turned out, was similarly unpalatable to the labor 
movement. “After the criminal sanction had been replaced by the injunction, 
the courts had continued to act far beyond their range of competency; adjudi-
cating without standards, without principles, and without restraint.”48 Now em-
boldened by the doctrines of civil conspiracy, the courts began to pass judg-
ment both on the means used or contemplated (strikes and boycotts) and the 
ends sought (workforce organization).49 The Supreme Court declared that the 
law “prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which essentially ob-
structs the free flow of commerce between the states, or restricts, in that regard, 
the liberty of a trader to engage in business.”50 
                                                        
43  Commonwealth v. Pullis, (Philadelphia Cordwainers’ Case), Philadelphia Mayor’s Ct. 
(1806). This case was not tried in a court of record, and thus an official written decision was 
not preserved; for a synopsis of the trial based on a contemporary account, see The Trial of 
the Boot & Shoemakers of Philadelphia, on an Indictment for a Combination and Conspira-
cy to Raise their Wages, in 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 
59 (John R. Commons et al., eds. 1910). 
44  Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. 111, 134 (1842) (holding that to find a union unlawful 
under the conspiracy doctrine the courts must find the objectives and/or activities of a union 
unlawful). 
45  State v. Donaldson, 32 N.J.L. 151, 158 (1867) (holding “the object of the combination . . . 
was to occasion a particular result which was mischievous, and by means which were op-
pressive”); Russell A. Smith, Significant Developments in Labor Law During the Last Half-
Century, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1266 (1952). 
46  Smith, supra note 45. 
47  Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Guilford Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1230 (1st Cir. 
1986) (citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895)). 
48  HARRY H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 39 (1968). 
49  See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 261–62 (1917) (holding 
that “yellow-dog contracts,” contracts wherein employees agreed not to join or associate 
with a union, were legal and binding by state and federal courts); Loewe v. Lawlor (Danbury 
Hatters’ Case), 208 U.S. 274, 292 (1908) (holding that the United Hatters’ nationwide boy-
cott was a restraint on interstate commerce in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
50  Danbury Hatters’ Case, 208 U.S. at 293, (holding that both primary and secondary boy-
cotts were actionable in damages pursuant to Section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust Act). 
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Although this period was marked by the liberal use of judicial injunctions 
to control collective action, some judges began to write passionate dissents rec-
ognizing the legal acceptability and social desirability of labor organizations.51 
In a dissent that seems strangely prophetic of today’s employment environ-
ment, Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, while sitting on the Massachusetts Su-
preme Court, wrote: 
It is plain from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most super-
ficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means combination, and 
that the organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever-
increasing might and scope of combination. . . . Whether beneficial on the 
whole, as I think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axi-
oms of society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed. 
One of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made up is that between the 
effort of every man to get the most he can for his services, and that of society, 
disguised under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible re-
turn. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful. Combination on the 
other is the necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on 
in a fair and equal way.52 
Though it was still years from taking hold, the view expressed in Judge 
Holmes’ dissent eventually won the day. A system based upon free competition 
is strongest when workers, acting in concert with one another, are provided 
equal footing with management in the negotiation of the terms and conditions 
of their employment. However, absent legislative protections of a worker’s 
right to engage in collective action, Judge Holmes’ words would remain purely 
prophetic—arguably persuasive, but legally inconsequential. 
C. Evolution of Legislative Support 
The lack of legislative guidance during this era may indicate “that the leg-
islatures on the whole were satisfied with the results of judicial intervention,” 
but it also suggests that organized labor lacked political power or interest.53 
Accordingly, most of Congress’s pro-labor legislation during this period was 
limited to railway workers,54 but in 1914, the tide shifted significantly when 
Congress enacted the Clayton Act.55 
                                                        
51  TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 76–78 (discussing the impact of Holmes’s & Brande-
is’s dissents). 
52  Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 108 (1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
53  Smith, supra note 45, at 1267. 
54  See, e.g., Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577–78 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 
U.S.C. §§ 151–88 (2012)) (supporting collective bargaining and protecting railway workers’ 
rights to organize); Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428 (1898) (forbidding 
employers in the railroad industry from executing “yellow dog” contracts). 
55  Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–19, 
21–27 and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)). Samuel Gompers, the president of the American 
Federation of Labor, declared the Clayton Act (Section 6) as “the Magna Carta upon which 
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The Clayton Act declared that human labor was not to be considered an ar-
ticle of commerce and that the existence of unions was not to be considered a 
violation of antitrust laws.56 In addition, the Act prohibited federal courts from 
issuing injunctions in labor disputes except to prevent irreparable injury to 
property.57 Congress intended for this prohibition to be absolute when peaceful 
picketing and boycotts were involved.58 The Supreme Court, not of the same 
opinion, ruled that the Sherman Antitrust Act as amended by the Clayton Act 
still permitted employers injunctive relief from secondary boycotts (boycotts 
against suppliers or vendors of the employer).59 
In 1927, Congress presided over public hearings as it considered introduc-
tion of an anti-injunction bill.60 These hearings set the stage for passage of the 
NLRA. The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 effectively blocked the judiciary 
from handing out labor injunctions and from enforcing employment contracts 
wherein laborers agreed not to associate with unions (yellow-dog contracts).61 
Then in 1933, President Roosevelt’s New Deal plan, which was intended to 
spark economic recovery from the Great Depression, gave rise to the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (“NIRA”).62 Section 7(a) of NIRA protected workers’ 
rights to form or join unions of their choosing and to engage in collective bar-
gaining.63 
Unfortunately, NIRA failed to specify the very labor practices it purported 
to prohibit, and it provided no substantive mechanisms for enforcement.64 The 
resulting wave of union unrest and strike activity over that summer prompted 
President Roosevelt to create the National Labor Board to interpret and enforce 
the new law.65 Though the Board was initially successful in settling the dis-
putes of hundreds of thousands of workers, by February of 1934, the Board was 
ineffective and on the verge of collapse.66 Soon thereafter, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held NIRA unconstitutional in its entirety.67 
                                                                                                                                
the working people will rear their structure of industrial freedom.” DANIEL R. ERNST, 
LAWYERS AGAINST LABOR: FROM INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS TO CORPORATE LIBERALISM 165 
(1995). 
56  Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). 
57  Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2012); Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. Guilford 
Transp. Indus., 803 F.2d 1228, 1231 (1st Cir. 1986). 
58  See Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 803 F.2d at 1233–34. 
59  Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478–79 (1921) (holding Section 20’s 
prohibition on injunctions is to be narrowed to disputes between parties in the proximate re-
lation of employer and employee and not to secondary boycotts). 
60  TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 78. 
61  Id. at 78–79, 81, 84. 
62  Id. at 150. 
63  Id. at 151. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Id. at 152–53. 
67  Id. at 157; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). 
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Precisely one month later, Congress overwhelmingly passed the National 
Labor Relations Act.68 The Act’s preamble declares that it is the policy of the 
United States to protect a worker’s full freedom of association, self-
organization, and designation of representatives for the purpose of negotiating 
the terms and conditions of employment.69 Finally, after years of struggling to 
highlight their plight, the laborers who protected their employment with little 
more than their endurance of muscle, silence of complaint, and employer’s fa-
vor, now had a voice not easily suppressed. The NLRA established the will of 
the people, through their Congress, to balance the power dynamics in the em-
ployment relationship; Congress’s constitutional authority to regulate interstate 
commerce became the vehicle for that reform.70 
II. EVOLUTION OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
In 1937, two years after enactment of the NLRA, the Supreme Court ruled 
upon the Act’s constitutionality.71 In holding that the Act could be “construed 
so as to operate within the sphere of constitutional authority,”72 the Court found 
that labor relations had the potential to “burden[] or obstruct[]” interstate com-
merce.73 The Court then succinctly described the essence of the struggle: 
Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employ-
ees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation 
by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor or-
ganizations. We said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situa-
tion; that a single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he 
was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and 
family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, 
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair 
treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on an 
equality with their employer.74 
For over seventy-eight years, the NLRA has stood for the proposition that 
equalizing the bargaining power between labor and management would aid the 
flow of commerce. The manner of equalization, borne of industrial-era reali-
ties, was collective action through unionization. It is important to note, howev-
er, that Congress did not enact the NLRA specifically to sanction unionization 
                                                        
68  The Schecter decision was handed down on May 27, 1935, and the NLRA was passed on 
June 27, 1935. TAYLOR & WITNEY, supra note 2, at 157–58. 
69  National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
70  “Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively . . . promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized 
sources of industrial strife and unrest, . . . and by restoring equality of bargaining power be-
tween employers and employees.” Id. 
71  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 31–32. 
74  Id. at 33. 
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per se; rather, the Act was intended to protect the flow of commerce from the 
negative effects of unfair labor practices.75 In 1935, a union’s threat to termi-
nate, interrupt, or slow down production was such a formidable hazard, it 
served as the single most effective tool to compel that equalization. 
Today, the notion that the equalization of bargaining power grows from a 
combination of workers beholden to the same employer fails to account for 
twenty-first century realities. Given the manner in which globalization, auto-
mation, and virtual communities shape today’s employment environment, the 
potency of a union’s threat to strike is greatly diminished.76 Of much greater 
potency is the diminution of a company’s brand. In an age where information is 
king, where “googling” has become a standard part of the lexicon, and where 
online posts have the permanency of digital tattoos, companies are more likely 
to fear damage to brand than damage to production. Consequently, the NLRB’s 
lack of consistent guidance on issues related to viral action frustrates the fun-
damental goal of the NLRA: to protect the flow of commerce from the negative 
effects of unfair labor practices.77 
A. Yesterday’s Success, Today’s Reality 
In the thirty years immediately following enactment of the NLRA, the Act 
was generally successful in achieving its goal.78 Many of the benefits conferred 
upon today’s workers grew from these successes and have become so conven-
tional that they are no longer seen as progressive. In fact, legislation adminis-
tered by designated government agencies now protects many of the terms and 
conditions of employment that laborers so vigorously fought to secure.79 In-
deed, the NLRB’s website directs aggrieved workers whose complaints do not 
fall within the NLRB’s authority to one of seven federal labor agencies or to an 
                                                        
75  National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012)). 
76  “Today, the right to strike is so weak that unions rarely utilize it, and serious efforts are 
underway to weaken it further.” Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, The Continuing As-
sault on the Right to Strike, 79 TEX. L. REV. 703, 704 (2001). 
77  See 49 Stat. at 449. 
78  Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law for the 
Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327, 329 (2011). 
79  The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division oversees complaints related to wag-
es, tips, work hours, overtime, breaks, vacation pay, or the Family Medical Leave Act. See 
Related Agencies, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/related-agencies 
(last visited Oct. 18, 2014). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration oversees 
work-related safety and health issues. Id. Employees discriminated against because of race, 
ethnicity, religion, age, gender, national origin or sexual orientation can seek relief through 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. Employees discriminated against be-
cause of immigration or citizenship status or because of national origin can contact the De-
partment of Justice’s Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment 
Practices. Id. 
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appropriate state labor office.80 As a result, twenty-first century workers have 
several legal mechanisms at their disposal to help combat abuses of worker 
rights. Nevertheless, abuses continue. 
Take for example the reemergence of garment center sweatshops in the 
United States, brought to the public eye in 1995. “In Los Angeles, labor offi-
cials discovered a slave-sweatshop where [eighty] Thai immigrants were forced 
to sew brand-name clothes in a compound behind razor wire and armed guards. 
The workers earned $2 per hour for making clothes later sold at major 
stores.”81 Companies unwilling or unable to facilitate such blatantly prohibited, 
immoral operations in the United States may try to shield themselves from U.S. 
labor laws by offshoring the labor. 
In Honduras, girls as young as 13 were found sewing clothing for TV talk-show 
host Kathie Lee Gifford’s apparel line sold at Wal-Mart. The girls worked from 
7:30am to 9:00pm, Monday through Friday, and because of forced overtime to 
meet rush orders, the children were not permitted to attend night school, where 
from 6:00 pm to 10:00 pm they could have studied to complete their grammar 
school educations.82 
Offshoring of unskilled labor, however, may not be sufficient to shield 
U.S. corporations from shouldering financial responsibility for tragedies that 
occur as a result of negligent operations. 
[A Bangladeshi garment worker] demand[s] that Walmart, which, among other 
retailers, had clothes manufactured at the facility, pay compensation to victims 
like herself and the families of those who died . . . . 
. . . . 
The disaster at Tazreen was the worst garment factory fire in the history of 
Bangladesh. Many of the [112] deceased were burned beyond recognition, and 
as many as 53 bodies were buried unclaimed, according to reports in Bangla-
desh. 
The factory’s safety lapses have been well documented. The massive build-
ing didn’t have a staircase mounted to the outside for emergency exit, and each 
floor had windows securely bolted with iron frames, effectively turning the fac-
tory into a cage for workers.83 
These examples highlight the inhumane working conditions inflicted upon 
industrial workers in the years since enactment of the NLRA. Can it be that the 
                                                        
80  Id. 
81  Background on Sweatshops, DO SOMETHING, http://www.dosomething.org/tipsandtools 
/background-sweatshops (last visited Oct. 18, 2014). 
82  Id. 
83  Dave Jamieson & Emran Hossain, Bangladesh Factory Fire Victim Calls On Walmart to 
Pay Compensation, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Apr. 12, 2013, 6:11 PM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/12/_n_3071974.html. The local business owner and manage-
ment team have since been indicted. Farid Ahmed, Bangladesh Court Orders Arrest of Ap-
parel Factory Owner, Five Others, CNN (Dec. 31, 2013, 7:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com 
/2013/12/31/world/asia/bangladesh-fire-arrest-orders/. 
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more things change, the more they stay the same? In truth, one of the most ef-
fective strategies for improving egregious terms and conditions of employment 
is to shine a light on them. Labor organizers who once stood on public side-
walks in front of factories holding up signs denouncing deplorable conditions, 
today can put that same message in front of millions more consumers by post-
ing it online. Today, all David may need to take down Goliath is a smart phone 
and a Twitter account. 
B. The Twenty-First Century Difference: Viral Action 
A key difference between aggrieved employees of the past and aggrieved 
employees of today is that today’s employees have extraordinary, high-speed 
access to a tremendous number of eyes and ears. The power of social media 
coupled with the reach of the World Wide Web enables every employee with a 
smart phone, social media account, or Internet access to publish their grievanc-
es with blazing speed and ominous longevity. The ubiquity of social media 
tools like text messaging, e-mail, photo sharing, social networking, blogs, and 
review sites reveals the extraordinary expressive capability supplied by today’s 
media landscape. 
This capability provides employees with an unprecedented ability to dis-
tribute information, organize supporters, and coordinate campaigns. Prior to the 
widespread use of social media, access to media was expensive and required 
the assistance of professionals to publish, mail, or broadcast messages to the 
media’s consumers. Additionally, the effectiveness of these “non-social media” 
(NSM) tools was limited to either the distribution of a single message to many 
consumers (TV, radio, newspapers, mass mail), or the development of a mes-
sage with a single consumer (telephone, telegraph, fax). Consequently, labor 
organizers endeavoring to develop accurate, compelling messages for mass dis-
tribution were encumbered by the many limitations of NSM. 
“The media that is good at creating conversations is no good at creating 
groups. And the media that is good at creating groups is no good at creating 
conversations.”84 In this media landscape, if you wanted to have a conversa-
tion, you interacted with one other person; if you wanted to address a group, 
you were limited to one message for the entire group. The unfortunate conse-
quence of the “one-to-many” messages delivered via NSM was that organizers 
had to write broadly phrased, inexact messages in the hopes of inspiring as 
wide-ranging a group as possible. The recipients of these messages were essen-
tially spectators unable to resolve misunderstandings, disagreements, or appre-
hensions without engaging in a time-consuming, perhaps costly, “one-to-one” 
manner of communication. 
                                                        
84  Clay Shirky, How Social Media Can Make History, TED, 03:06 (June 2009), http:// 
www.ted.com/talks/clay_shirky_how_cellphones_twitter_facebook_can_make_history.html. 
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Those days are gone, never to return. Gone are the days when consuming 
information was an inherently passive experience. Today, social media tools 
permit every media consumer to also be a producer.85 Information sharing has 
become so quick, inexpensive, and easy that the spectator paralysis typical of 
the NSM consumer has become an unfamiliar concept to members of the for-
mer audience.86 “And to put it in one bleak sentence, no medium has ever sur-
vived the indifference of 25-year-olds.”87 
Media is no longer strictly a source of information; it is now, more and 
more, a source of coordination. Labor campaigns have effectively used this 
technology to redefine collective action, and their efforts have caused powerful, 
multinational corporations to overhaul labor-averse employment policies. As 
an example, Wal-Mart, often a target of such efforts, has yielded to public pres-
sure over worker rights and has conceded that it needs to do more in its efforts 
to improve its foreign labor standards.88 Today, non-profit pro-labor organiza-
tions routinely organize significant support through Facebook, Twitter, and 
other social media sites. 
Companies, well aware of the power of social media to shape their brands, 
spend vast fortunes and significant man-hours each year on elevating their 
online image.89 They also must devote resources to the development of social 
media policies that will both advance their business interests and protect their 
brand.90 Often these two goals are in direct conflict with one another, and often 
the resulting policies impermissibly restrict employee rights to engage in col-
lective action. 
All the while, the NLRB struggles to define a meaningful Social Media 
Policy. 
                                                        
85  See DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA 84 (2004), available at 
http://www.authorama.com/book/we-the-media.html. 
86  Id. at 141 (defining the former audience as a consumer of information who actively en-
gages and contributes to the knowledge store). 
87  Decca Aitkenhead, Clay Shirky: ‘Paywall Will Underperform—the Numbers Don’t Add 
Up’, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jul/05 
/clay-shirky-internet-television-newspapers. 
88  Jessica Wohl, Walmart Promises to Strengthen Supply Chain Safeguards After Bangla-
desh Factory Fire, HUFFINGTON POST BUS. (Dec. 11, 2012, 1:13 AM), http://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/11/_n_2275783.html. 
89  See, e.g., Louise Story, The New Advertising Outlet: Your Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2007, at BU3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/business/media/14ad.html; 
Craig Carter, 15 Viral Marketing Examples over the Past 5 Years, IGNITE SOC. MEDIA (Sept. 
18, 2013), http://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/social-media-examples/15-viral-marketing-ex 
amples-campaigns-past-5-years/. 
90  Spencer Hamer, Creating an Effective Workplace Social Media Policy, BLOOMBERG LAW 
(July 29, 2013), http://www.bna.com/creating-an-effective-workplace-social-media-policy/. 
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III. DEFINING A MEANINGFUL SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY 
The NLRB’s latest report concerning social media cases91 may have done 
more to confuse than to clarify what is required for a lawful workplace Social 
Media Policy (“SMP”).92 The report provides a series of examples to distin-
guish lawful SMP provisions from unlawful SMP provisions.93 Unfortunately, 
a judicious reading of the report provides little assurance that today’s accepta-
ble SMP will not become tomorrow’s unlawful prohibition of employee rights 
to communicate about work-related grievances. Section 7 protects the right of 
workers to take collective action to improve their working conditions. Thus, it 
protects most employee comments about the terms and conditions of their em-
ployment, so long as the comments are not made “solely by and on behalf of 
the employee himself” or they are not “mere griping.”94 
With such seemingly strong protections in place for employee communica-
tions, employers struggle to promulgate failsafe policies designed to promote 
workplace civility.95 Additionally, employer policies designed to prevent dis-
closure of confidential workplace-related information are unlawful unless they 
clearly exempt Section 7 activity.96 The unavoidable result is an uneasy tension 
between the employers’ business interests and the employees’ right to engage 
in collective action to improve working conditions. While the NLRB recogniz-
es this tension, its SMP decisions have done little to relieve it. 
Given the substantial authority of the NLRB to declare employer SMPs un-
lawful,97 many employers must turn to the NLRB’s published decisions, rec-
                                                        
91  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 2 (May 30, 2012) (construing poli-
cies presented in cases before the NLRB). 
92  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Even If It Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech Is Protect-
ed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/ 
technology/employers-social-media-policies-come-under-regulatory-scrutiny.html (“Even 
when you review the [NLRB] rules and think you’re following the mandates, there’s still a 
good deal of uncertainty.” (quoting labor attorney Steven M. Swirsky)). 
93  See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (analyzing SMP provisions 
reviewed by NLRB). 
94  Ann C. McGinley & Ryan P. McGinley-Stempel, Beyond the Water Cooler: Speech and 
the Workplace in an Era of Social Media, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 75, 89–90 (2012) 
(quoting Wal-Mart, Case 17-CA-25030, Advice Memorandum, at 3 (July 19, 2011)); see 
also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in sec-
tion 157 of this title . . . .”). 
95  See, e.g., Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 2, 4 (Dec. 14, 2012) 
(employer’s “zero tolerance” policy prohibiting “bullying and harassment” does not insulate 
it from Section 8 violations); Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (Sept. 28, 
2012) (employer’s “Courtesy” rule unlawful because it may chill protected speech). 
96  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 5. 
97  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). 
15 NEV. L.J. 354 - LOGAN.DOCX 3/4/2015  2:54 PM 
370 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:354 
ommendations, and examples for guidance.98 Ultimately, rules that employees 
would reasonably construe “to chill . . . the exercise of their Section 7 rights” 
are unlawful.99 Thus, rules that explicitly abridge employees’ ability to discuss 
with one another the conditions of their employment are unlawful.100 
Rules that do not explicitly restrict these protected activities, however, will 
only be deemed unlawful “upon a showing that: (1) employees would reasona-
bly construe the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule was prom-
ulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been applied to restrict 
the exercise of Section 7 rights.”101 Furthermore, rules that clearly outline their 
purpose and then restrict the scope of their enforcement with well-defined ex-
amples of illegal or unprotected conduct are only lawful to the extent that em-
ployees would not reasonably construe the rule to cover protected activity.102 
A. Defining the Acceptable Confidentiality Standard 
Although “[t]he Board has long recognized that employees have a right to 
discuss wages and conditions of employment with third parties as well as each 
other,”103 the Board also recognizes a legitimate need for employers to keep 
certain corporate, financial, or trade information confidential.104 Nevertheless, 
absent clear examples or context excepting Section 7 activity, rules similar to 
those listed below are overbroad and therefore unlawful105: 
• restrictions on “release [of] confidential guest, team member or compa-
ny information,” to include employee salary information;106 
• rules requiring social media interactions be “completely accurate and 
not misleading”;107 
• rules requiring that employees “not . . . reveal non-public company in-
formation on any public site.”108 Such nonpublic information includes: 
o “any topic related to the financial performance of the company”;109 
                                                        
98  See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (providing framework for 
analysis and construction of lawful SMPs). 
99  Id. at 3 (quoting Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 N.L.R.B. 824, 825 (1998), enforced, 203 F.3d 
52 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
100  Id. (citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 646, 647 (2004)). 
101  Id. (emphasis added). 
102  Id. (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 460–62 (2002)). 
103  Id. at 4 (citing e.g., Cintas Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 943, 943 (2005), enforced, 482 F.3d 463 
(D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
104  Id. at 7, 18. 
105  See generally id. (construing legality of SMP provisions presented in cases before the 
NLRB). 
106  Id. at 4. 
107  Id. at 6. 
108  Id. at 7. 
109  Id. 
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o “information that has not already been disclosed by authorized per-
sons in a public forum”;110 
o “personal information about another [Employer] employee, such as 
performance, compensation or status in the company”;111 and 
o “confidential or proprietary” company information.112 
• restrictions on providing such information to blogs, the press, or gov-
ernment agencies;113 
• “rule[s] that require employees to get permission before reusing others’ 
content or images,” even where such material is protected by copy-
right;114 and 
• “provisions that threaten employees with discharge or criminal prosecu-
tion for failing to report unauthorized access to or misuse of confiden-
tial information.”115 
Note the inevitable tension here: the NLRB has recognized the need for 
employees to organize and discuss information that the NLRB has recognized 
employers may need to keep confidential. Thus, many seemingly sensible em-
ployer policies intended to safeguard sensitive company information inevitably 
fall short of protecting the employee, the employer, or the information. 
B. Defining the Acceptable Civility Standard 
Likewise, the NLRB deems rules governing employee civility—absent 
clear examples or context excepting Section 7 activity—to be overbroad and 
therefore unlawful.116 Employers must carefully construct rules of workplace 
civility such that employees are not chilled from engaging in concerted activity. 
Accordingly, when devoid of context, rules like the following are unlawful:117 
• suggestions that employees “resolve concerns about work by speaking 
with co-workers, supervisors, or managers” rather than by posting com-
plaints on the Internet;118 
• “provision[s] prohibiting employees from expressing their personal 
opinions to the public regarding the workplace, work satisfaction or dis-
satisfaction, wages, hours or work conditions”;119 
                                                        
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 13. 
113  Id. at 18–19. 
114  Id. at 11. 
115  Id. at 5. 
116  Id. at 20. 
117  See generally id. (construing legality of SMP provisions presented in cases before the 
NLRB). 
118  Id. at 11. 
119  Id. at 14. 
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• provisions “warning employees to avoid harming the image and integri-
ty of the company”;120 
• restrictions on “negative conversations” about managers or working 
conditions;121 
• “prohibition[s] on making disparaging or defamatory comments.”122 
Still, the NLRB recognizes that employers have “a legitimate basis to pro-
hibit [some] workplace communications.”123 As a result, employees can lose 
the Act’s protection (even if the SMP provision is found to be unlawful) when 
they combine concerted protected activity with egregious behavior, including 
displays of an “opprobrious or abusive manner.”124 
Finally, the NLRB report concludes that an employer’s use of a “saving 
clause”125 does not cure otherwise unlawful provisions, so long as the clause 
fails to explain in layperson’s terms what the right to engage in “concerted ac-
tivity” entails.126 
IV. DIFFICULTIES WITH IMPLEMENTING THE NLRB’S SMP GUIDANCE 
The NLRB’s attempt at clarifying the requirements for lawful SMPs has 
struck some corporate officials as being more about show than substance; more 
about “an effort to remain relevant” in the twenty-first century than about pro-
tecting collective bargaining rights.127 The Board’s inconsistent adaptation of 
the NLRA to social media policies is “causing concern and confusion.”128 This 
confusion sprouts from the subjective nature of the unpredictable, fact-specific 
analysis found in many NLRB decisions related to social media. 
For example, in Karl Knauz Motors, the NLRB found a “Courtesy” rule 
unlawful because of its broad prohibition against “disrespectful” conduct and 
“language which injures the image or reputation of the [employer].”129 Yet in 
Tradesmen International, the Board discusses a series of cases where it viewed 
essentially the same facts in the opposite manner when it found rules prohibit-
                                                        
120  Id. at 13. 
121  Id. (citing Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005)). 
122  Id. at 17. 
123  Id. at 20. 
124  Cellco P’ship, 349 N.L.R.B. 640, 646 (2007). 
125  A severability clause or “saving clause” is “a provision that keeps the remaining provi-
sions of a contract or statute in force if any portion of that contract or statute is judicially de-
clared void, unenforceable, or unconstitutional.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1498 (9th ed. 
2009). 
126  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 14 (citing Clearwater Paper Corp., Case 
19-CA-064418). 
127  See Greenhouse, supra note 92. 
128  Id. 
129  Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
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ing conduct “tending to damage or discredit an employer’s reputation to be 
lawful.”130 
Employers desirous of providing guidance through SMPs have their hands 
tied as they seek to promote civility and decorum in the workplace. On the one 
hand, employers are compelled to create policies that outline acceptable behav-
ior;131 on the other, they are constrained by the NLRB’s application of Section 
7 to SMPs. “The [NLRB] says workers have a right to discuss work conditions 
freely and without fear of retribution, whether the discussion takes place at the 
office or on Facebook.”132 Employers, obliged to maintain good-natured work 
environments, must read between the lines of the NLRB’s conflicting messages 
in order to uncover meaningful solutions. 
A. Conflicting Confidentiality Messages 
The NLRB’s position on confidentiality policies is firmly rooted in a desire 
to ensure that employers do not mislead employees into believing that their 
Section 7 rights are somehow restricted.133 A noble desire. NLRB decisions, 
however, have not been so stationary. This surreal dichotomy—NLRB’s noble 
desire, tainted by nomadic execution—is difficult to reconcile. The NLRB so-
cial media report deems unlawful an instruction that employees not “release 
confidential guest, team member or company information” because employees 
could reasonably interpret it as restricting them from discussing and disclosing 
their conditions of employment.134 The NLRB then suggests, however, that 
where employers include such a rule within a list of prohibited “egregious con-
duct,” the surrounding context will preclude employees from reasonably con-
struing the confidentiality rule as restricting Section 7 activity.135 
For example, in response to a challenged SMP involving employees post-
ing employer related information to blogs, message boards, social networks, 
and other online media, the NLRB issued the following advice136: “A prohibi-
tion against ‘negative conversations’ about managers within a list of policies 
                                                        
130  Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462 (2002), quoted in Karl Knauz Motors, 358 
N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 4 n.9 (Hayes, Member, dissenting). 
131  McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 94, at 87 (discussing requirement for certain 
employer policies mandated by Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes). 
132  Greenhouse, supra note 92. 
133  See generally OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91 (analyzing provisions from 
SMPs reviewed by NLRB). 
134  Id. at 4. 
135  Id. at 13–14 (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 N.L.R.B. 460, 462). 
136  Christine Neylon O’Brien, The First Facebook Firing Case Under Section 7 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act: Exploring the Limits of Labor Law Protection for Concerted 
Communication on Social Media, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 41 (2011) (referencing Advice 
Memorandum, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Sears Holdings (Roebucks), No. 18-CA-19081 
(NLRB Dec. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Sears Advice Memo], available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov 
/link/document.aspx/09031d45802d802f.) 
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about working conditions [is] deemed unlawful due to its ‘potential chilling ef-
fect.’ ”137 The advice went on to say, “[i]n contrast, a rule that prohibit[s] 
statements ‘slanderous or detrimental to the company’ within a list of prohibit-
ed conduct including ‘sexual or racial harassment’ and ‘sabotage’ would not 
reasonably be understood to restrict section 7 activity because the context 
list[s] examples of ‘egregious misconduct.’ ”138 
Similarly, the NLRB found a Wal-Mart confidentiality provision lawful 
because it contained the following examples of prohibited disclosures: “infor-
mation regarding the development of systems, processes, products, know-how, 
technology, internal reports, procedures, or other internal business-related 
communications.”139 It seems odd that such a facile list is sufficient to save an 
otherwise unlawful provision. The more convincing analysis suggests that em-
ployees could easily construe each of those prohibitions as chilling their right 
to discuss the conditions of their employment. In truth, an employee fearful of 
a hazardous, disorganized procedure that his employer will soon impose on him 
would reasonably construe such a provision as restricting his right to discuss 
this procedure with others. Certainly, terms like “other internal business-related 
communications” are too broad. 
This sort of inconsistency encumbers the employer’s ability and willing-
ness to develop SMPs that adequately protect either the employer’s or the em-
ployee’s interests. The NLRB’s insistence that clear examples and proper con-
text will somehow remove ambiguity from rules meant to regulate such 
inherently disparate interests, therefore, seems misplaced. For every example of 
inappropriate conduct not protected by Section 7, there is a protected example 
not far behind. Thus, to be failsafe, SMPs must be overflowing with precise, 
detailed examples. 
That said, what sort of specificity would be necessary to protect both the 
employer’s confidentiality rights and the employee’s Section 7 rights in em-
ployment environments like Triangle Waist or Tazreen? 
Consider the following scenario: A garment factory in Massachusetts em-
ploys several hundred laborers in the production of athletic attire for sale at na-
tional retailers. Prior to the start of their employment, each laborer signed a 
document indicating their acceptance and understanding of the employer’s so-
cial media policy. This policy included a confidentiality clause that prohibited 
the disclosure of information regarding the development of systems, processes, 
                                                        
137  Id. at 42 (quoting Sears Advice Memo, supra note 136, at 5 (citing Claremont Resort & 
Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836 (2005))); see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, 
at 13 (citing Claremont Resort & Spa, 344 N.L.R.B. 832, 836). 
138  O’Brien, supra note 136, at 42 (quoting Sears Advice Memo, supra note 131, at 5–6); 
see also OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 13–14 (citing Tradesmen Int’l, 338 
N.L.R.B. 460, 462). 
139  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 20 (citing Walmart, Case 11-CA-
067171). 
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products, know-how, technology, internal reports, or procedures. After working 
at the factory for several months, several of the employees began to commiser-
ate with one another about the unsafe, custom-made machinery recently in-
stalled on the production line. They discussed ways of bringing their safety 
concerns to the attention of management. That night, one of the employees 
posted a photograph of the overcrowded production line to his Facebook ac-
count. Under the photo he declared, “Someday somebody walking through this 
factory is going to get hurt by this crappy machine.” A different employee, un-
aware of the previous post, posted to his Twitter account a similar photograph 
accompanied by the statement, “We should not have to work under these un-
safe conditions.” A week later, they both were fired. 
The current state of NLRB jurisprudence would seem to indicate that al-
though both employees were engaged in concerted activity, only the second 
employee’s post would receive protection under the NLRA.140 In Five Star 
Transportation, the NLRB found that of eleven letters written by a group of 
school bus drivers and sent to the School District as part of a letter-writing 
campaign, only six were entitled to protection.141 The NLRB separated the 
eleven drivers into three groups, based on their individual letters.142 In analyz-
ing the first group, the Board found that the relationship between the content of 
the employees’ letters and their status as employees in search of mutual aid or 
protection was so attenuated that they were not entitled to the Act’s protec-
tion.143 
In the case of [the first group of drivers], we find that the content of their let-
ters was not sufficiently related to the drivers’ terms and conditions of employ-
ment to constitute protected conduct. In their letters, [they] focused solely on 
general safety concerns and did not indicate that their concerns were related to 
the safety of the drivers as opposed to others. . . . Further, we are not persuaded 
that these two letters should be interpreted as raising the drivers’ common con-
cerns simply because they were written as part of the drivers’ letter-writing 
campaign. Instead, we determine whether certain communications are protected 
by examining the communications themselves.144 
This treatment does not bode well for social media posts. The very nature 
of social media is antithetical to a system that confers protection by examining 
individual communications excised from their respective campaigns (their con-
text). The astounding influence of social media campaigns derives from social 
media’s revolutionary distribution scheme. Every individual with access to the 
network is essentially a multi-national publisher. Every individual with access 
                                                        
140  The above scenario is loosely based on the facts of Five Star Transportation, and the 
NLRB’s response indicated here is consistent with that holding. See Five Star Transp., Inc., 
349 N.L.R.B. 42 (2007). 
141  Id. at 44–47.  
142  Id. at 44. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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to the network can potentially advance an expression to a very large group of 
people; each recipient can in turn respond to the sender, to any other individual 
group member, to the entire group, or to an entirely new group. This one-to-
many, many-to-one, many-to-many approach to distribution makes the NLRB’s 
individual communication analysis unwieldy, impractical, and unrealistic. After 
all, a single post divorced from its contextual underpinnings may suggest a 
meaning entirely dissimilar from what was intended. 
As for the hypothetical garment factory’s SMP, the confidentiality clause 
appears to be lawful as it essentially mirrors the acceptable Wal-Mart policy 
above. Thus, any violation of the policy could rightfully serve as a terminable 
offense (unless the violation qualified for NLRA protection for some other rea-
son). That said, the employer’s authority here quickly becomes uncertain with 
the addition of a third, fourth, or fifth employee who refused to respond to the 
posts because they feared doing so would violate the confidentiality clause.145 
The chilling effect of this policy would presumably render the policy unlawful 
and preclude the company from using it as a means to terminate any of the em-
ployees. Employees who successfully link their fear of concerted activity—and 
their resulting inactivity—to an employer’s social media policy have likely 
struck the Achilles’ heel of the offending policy. However, this ‘chilling effect’ 
doctrine poses two problems. For the discouraged employee, the problem is 
that deterred activity is difficult to confirm. For the employer, the problem is 
that the level of SMP specificity required to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
sensitive information while not discouraging concerted activity is unfathoma-
ble. 
Nevertheless, specificity remains a fundamental element of the ideal SMP, 
and labor lawyers are wrestling with how to best advise clients on the NLRB 
guidance. SMPs must be more specific; they must go beyond simply barring 
workers from posting confidential information, advises labor lawyer Denise M. 
Keyser.146 Ms. Keyser recommends explicitly restricting disclosure of “trade 
secrets, product introduction dates or private health details.”147 But not even 
specificity, according to labor lawyer Steven M. Swirsky, can keep employers 
from crossing the legal line.148 “Even when you review the [NLRB] rules and 
think you’re following the mandates, there’s still a good deal of uncertainty.”149 
This uncertainty, unfortunately, is not constrained to policies barring disclosure 
of confidential information. 
                                                        
145  See Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 2 (Sept. 28, 2012) (citing “Board 
precedent holding that an employer rule is unlawful if employees would reasonably under-
stand it to apply to protected activity.”). 
146  Greenhouse, supra note 92. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  Id. (quoting Swirsky). 
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B. Conflicting Civility Messages 
Uncertainty is similarly pervasive in NLRB decisions involving social me-
dia policies related to workplace civility. Anti-discrimination statutes incentiv-
ize employers to protect themselves from claims by implementing policies to 
regulate harassing, discriminatory, and hostile employee speech—whether it 
occurs at work or online.150 Apparently sympathetic to this need, the NLRB 
endorsed an employer’s “Be Respectful” rule and, in so doing, stated that “[t]he 
Employer has a legitimate basis to prohibit such workplace communica-
tions.”151 
The policy advised against posts that “could be viewed as malicious, ob-
scene, threatening or intimidating,” and it explained that “prohibited ‘harass-
ment or bullying’ [includes] ‘offensive posts meant to intentionally harm 
someone’s reputation’ or ‘posts that could contribute to a hostile work envi-
ronment on the basis of race, sex, disability, religion or any other status pro-
tected by law or company policy.’ ”152 It is not difficult to understand why such 
civility policies are necessary, and in some cases required by law, but it is diffi-
cult to understand the Board’s tendency to contravene both precedent and pub-
lic policy when resolving civility complaints. 
The Board’s mistreatment of a social media expression’s evolution into 
demonstrable collective action seems to be at the core of the uncertainty. The 
social media expression’s metamorphosis invariably commences with the ru-
minations of a single employee who seeks out understanding and support from 
his friends, family, and peers. This search for understanding and support begins 
with conversations within the employee’s community, and then evolves into 
organization, collaboration, and eventually collective action. In the past, the 
disgruntled employees’ understanding of their rights, their options, and their 
shared anguish required a time consuming, imprecise pursuit, and any subse-
quent organization or collaboration was additionally time consuming and 
fraught with impending termination if exposed. Today, the World Wide Web’s 
effortless capabilities mean that community is global, understanding is search-
able, and support is predictable. Consequently, the Board must reexamine how 
it evaluates the employee’s search for understanding and support. 
C. The Search for Understanding: Mere Griping or Initiating Group Action 
In a 2012 case, Hispanics United of Buffalo, an employer’s “zero toler-
ance” policy on bullying and harassment used substantially similar language to 
                                                        
150  McGinley & McGinley-Stempel, supra note 94, at 86–87 (discussing affirmative defens-
es through employer policies). 
151  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 20. 
152  Id. (quoting a sample SMP). 
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the “Be Respectful” policy endorsed in the NLRB report,153 yet the Board de-
termined that the policy was not a valid justification for the discharge of five 
employees who allegedly harassed another online.154 The Board affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that the allegedly harassing online 
behavior was protected concerted activity and that there was “no rational basis” 
for concluding that the behavior violated the policy.155 The dissent, however, 
articulated the view that the employees were legally terminated because their 
online behavior never rose above mere griping.156 The divergent views ex-
pressed in these conflicting opinions are indicative of the Board’s misunder-
standing of the evolution of a social media expression. 
If administrative law judges, NLRB members, and employers are unable to 
agree on the applicability of an employer’s “zero tolerance” courtesy policy to 
an employee’s behavior, it is disingenuous to assume that aggrieved employees 
can. Employees who are bullied or harassed in the workplace often find it diffi-
cult to describe their experience in a way that sounds plausible to themselves or 
others.157 Yet the reality is that large numbers of employees have experienced 
workplace bullying.158 “[B]ullying is a pervasive problem and not just the rare 
experience of a few ‘thin-skinned’ employees.”159 Employees subjected to 
abuse struggle to make sense of their experience and often blame themselves 
for being targeted.160 
Social media conversations facilitate targeted group discussion, much like 
a focus group, and provide employees with the tools to identify, manage, and 
bring to an end the abusive conditions of their employment. Employees who 
reach out to similarly situated members of their online community may experi-
ence a synergy known as group effect that “occurs when participants hear oth-
ers’ verbalized experiences that, in turn, stimulate memories, ideas, and experi-
ences in themselves.”161 From this group conversation employees may discover 
a common language to vocalize their shared experience, and they may find val-
idation in discovering that they are not alone.162 
The Board’s analysis of whether an abused employee’s statements surpass 
mere griping may have just as chilling an effect on an employee’s willingness 
                                                        
153  Hispanics United of Buffalo, Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 10 (Dec. 14, 2012); OFFICE OF 
THE GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 91, at 22–23. 
154  Hispanics United, 359 N.L.R.B. No. 37, at 10. 
155  Id. at 4, 10. 
156  Id. at 4 (Hayes, Member, dissenting). 
157  Sarah J. Tracy et al., Nightmares, Demons, and Slaves: Exploring the Painful Metaphors 
of Workplace Bullying, 20 MGMT. COMM. Q. 148, 149 (2006). 
158  “From 25% to 30% of U.S. employees are bullied and emotionally abused sometime dur-
ing their work histories—10% at any given time.” Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. at 154. 
161  Id. at 155. 
162  Id. 
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to engage in concerted activity as any offending civility policy. Employees 
prohibited or hindered from posting their gripes online may never discover that 
common language that appropriately elevates their concern above a gripe. 
Their semantic ignorance becomes a cause for termination (if they post) or fur-
ther isolation (if they do not). Unfortunately for them, “[i]solation can serve as 
a punishment and further complicate targets’ efforts at collective resistance.”163 
D. The Search for Support: Sharing a Common Viewpoint or Preparation for 
Group Action 
The Board’s misunderstanding of the evolution of the social media expres-
sion is further evidenced by the analysis in Karl Knauz Motors. The NLRB de-
clared a “Courtesy” rule unlawful because of its broad prohibition against “dis-
respectful” conduct and “language which injures the image or reputation of the 
[employer].”164 The Board explained that employees could interpret the policy 
as restricting them from engaging in “protected statements—whether to 
coworkers, supervisors, managers, or third parties who deal with the [employ-
er]—that object to their working conditions and seek the support of others in 
improving them.”165 In this statement, the Board acknowledges the Act’s pro-
tection of expressions made to third parties if the statement’s purpose is to im-
prove employment conditions. 
The two expressions at issue in Karl Knauz Motors were posted to the em-
ployee’s Facebook page. The first expression, deemed concerted activity, in-
cluded a series of sarcastic, pointed comments below photographs of the food 
and beverages available at the BMW dealership’s sales event. One of those 
comments said, 
No, that’s not champagne or wine, it’s 8 oz. water. Pop or soda would be out 
of the question. In this photo, [a salesperson] is seen coveting the rare vintages 
of water that were available for our guests. 
. . . This is not a food event. What ever made you realize that?166 
The second expression, deemed not to be concerted activity, was in refer-
ence to a photograph of a car accident involving another one of the employer’s 
salespeople who had permitted a customer’s 13-year-old son to sit behind the 
wheel of a brand new Land Rover.167 The comment stated, 
This is what happens when a sales Person [sic] sitting in the front passenger 
seat (Former Sales Person, actually) allows a 13 year old boy to get behind the 
wheel of a 6000 lb. truck built and designed to pretty much drive over anything. 
                                                        
163  Id. at 168. 
164  Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
165  Id. 
166  Id. at 8. 
167  Id. at 7. 
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The kid drives over his father’s foot and into the pond in all about 4 seconds and 
destroys a $50,000 truck. OOOPS!168 
The day after the accident, because she permitted a child to sit behind the 
wheel of an unsecured vehicle, the dealership stripped the careless salesperson 
of her “demo” vehicle and her monthly gas and insurance allowance. The deal-
ership then provided her a used car and a $500 “demo allowance” until she was 
able to purchase her own vehicle.169 
The ALJ determined that the first statement qualified for protection of the 
Act because concerted activity may include individual activity where “individ-
ual employees seek to initiate or to induce or to prepare for group action, as 
well as individual employees bringing truly group complaints to the attention 
of management.”170 The ALJ was satisfied that, in spite of the absence of an 
expressed common cause amongst fellow employees, the postings stemmed 
from, or logically grew from, prior employee conversations.171 In contrast, the 
ALJ found that the second expression was neither protected nor concerted ac-
tivity.172 
It was posted solely by [the aggrieved employee], apparently as a lark, without 
any discussion with any other employee of the [employer], and had no connec-
tion to any of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. It is so obvi-
ously unprotected that it is unnecessary to discuss whether the mocking tone of 
the posting further affects the nature of the posting.173 
Consequently, a sarcastic comment about customers deprived of wine and 
champagne found protection in the Act because fellow employees had dis-
cussed it, and it could remotely influence the dealership’s image.174 Yet, a 
pointed jab at a crippling injury inflicted upon a customer by a poorly trained 
salesperson is “obviously unprotected” because there was no employee conver-
sation about it. This sort of circular logic is particularly dangerous when ap-
plied to social media posts. Board precedent is clear; concerted activity may 
include individual activity where “individual employees seek to initiate or to 
induce or to prepare for group action.”175 There is no requirement that prepara-
tion for group action include prior employee discussion. On this too, Board 
precedent is clear, the object or goal of initiating, inducing or preparing for 
group action does not have to be stated explicitly when employees communi-
                                                        
168  Id. at 8. 
169  Id. at 7 n.2. 
170  Id. at 10 (quoting Meyers Indus., Inc. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986)). 
171  Id. (citing NLRB v. Mike Yurosek & Son, 53 F.3d 261, 265 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
172  Id. at 10–11. 
173  Id. at 11. 
174  “[T]here may have been some customers who were turned off by the food offerings at 
the event and either did not purchase a car because of it, or gave the salesperson a lowering 
[sic] rating in the Customer Satisfaction Rating because of it; not likely, but possible.” Id. at 
10. 
175  Meyers Indus. (Meyers II), 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 887 (1986). 
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cate.176 By posting both expressions—on the same day—the employee was en-
gaging his community in a conversation related to the conditions of his em-
ployment. To believe otherwise is to believe that the employee had somehow 
utterly disassociated the champagne event, which he perceived as a manage-
ment failure, from the Land Rover event, which he perceived as a management 
failure. 
Such a belief misconstrues how conversations occur on social media. By 
viewing two social media posts made by the same person, on the same day, 
about the same topic in isolation from one another, the NLRB is essentially 
reading two random, disjointed pages of a novel and construing two plots. The 
overwhelming volume and speed of social media information exchanges re-
quires that seemingly disorganized conversations not be excised from their con-
text. 
A powerful global conversation has begun. Through the Internet, people are 
discovering and inventing new ways to share relevant knowledge with blinding 
speed. As a direct result, markets are getting smarter—and getting smarter faster 
than most companies. 
These markets are conversations. Their members communicate in language 
that is natural, open, honest, direct, funny, and often shocking. Whether explain-
ing or complaining, joking or serious, the human voice is unmistakably genuine. 
It can’t be faked.177 
A conversation that occurs in person or via an NSM tool is contextually 
fluid because the conversation is encapsulated within the confines of its trans-
mission. A conversation that takes place through social media often has neither 
a discernable start nor a discernable conclusion. While judicial economy re-
quires lines be drawn, the NLRB needlessly blurs those lines when it extricates 
expressions posted on the same day, on the same topic, by the same poster. 
At bottom, employers have a legitimate need to develop policies that dis-
courage the abusive behaviors that negatively influence workplace productivi-
ty, and the NLRB has a responsibility to protect the employee’s right to “en-
list[] the support of his fellow employees for their mutual aid and 
protection.”178 Regrettably, when the Board evaluates employee behavior di-
vorced from context, the Board’s treatment fails to advance either the employ-
ee’s Section 7 rights or the employer’s need to protect confidential data and 
manage workplace civility. 
Consider, for example, the contradictory decision rendered in Karl Knauz. 
In declaring the employer’s SMP unlawful, the Board explained, “an employee 
reading this rule would reasonably assume that [the employer] would regard 
statements of protest or criticism as ‘disrespectful’ or ‘injur[ious] [to] the im-
                                                        
176  Whittaker Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 933, 933 (1988). 
177  RICK LEVINE ET AL., THE CLUETRAIN MANIFESTO: THE END OF BUSINESS AS USUAL, at xxi 
(2001). 
178  Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969). 
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age or reputation of the [employer].’ ”179 Yet, in concluding that this policy 
would chill Section 7 activity, the Board seemingly disregarded its earlier find-
ing that the terminated employee was fully engaged in Section 7 activity during 
the posting that resulted in his termination.180 Evidently, the employee did not 
consider the policy to chill Section 7 activity. This result is difficult to recon-
cile. This is especially true given the Board’s more sensible conclusion in Sears 
Holdings that where employees continued to engage in Section 7 activities 
online in spite of a policy against it, the offending policy language was lawful 
because there was no evidence that employees’ Section 7 rights were chilled.181 
If the rights of both employees and employers are to be secured, the NLRB 
must promote policies that focus on informing employees of their protected 
Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accountable for brand-
shaping expressions that fall outside of those rights. The goal, after all, is to 
protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair labor practic-
es;182 the goal is not to stifle commerce with decisions rooted in cherry-picked 
facts and circumstances. 
V. EMPLOYER PROTECTION: THE OPPROBRIOUS CONDUCT EXCEPTION 
Some experts believe a well-structured social-media policy that clearly 
characterizes what is and is not appropriate social media behavior is an em-
ployer’s best defense against legal action.183 This policy, they suggest, must 
then become the focus of employee and employer training sessions in order to 
ensure understanding and compliance.184 Given the complexity of the Board’s 
treatment of concerted activity, the ironclad SMP appears to be both elusive 
and improbable. Adding to the confusion, even where the Board deems an em-
ployer’s social media policy unlawful, the employer may still properly termi-
nate the employee if his or her behavior crosses the line.185 That line, delineat-
ing protected concerted activity from unprotected concerted activity, is found 
through a balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors.186 
                                                        
179  Karl Knauz Motors, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 1 (second and third alteration in original). 
180  OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE 
ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES 8 (Aug. 18, 2011) (indicating 
NLRB’s conclusion that of the two Facebook posts the employee made, one was protected 
concerted activity). 
181  Sears Advice Memo, supra note 136, at 6. 
182  See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
183  Jeanette Borzo, Employers Tread a Minefield: Firings for Alleged Social-Media Infrac-
tions Sometimes Backfire on Companies, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Jan. 21, 2011, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703954004576089850685724570. 
184  Id. 
185  Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979) (identifying the factors related to losing the 
Act’s protection). 
186  Id. 
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[E]ven an employee who is engaged in concerted protected activity can, by op-
probrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act. 
The decision as to whether the employee has crossed that line depends on 
several factors: (1) the place of the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the dis-
cussion; (3) the nature of the employee’s outburst; and (4) whether the outburst 
was, in any way, provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice.187 
The NLRB has struggled to adequately define the parameters of the first 
and third of the Atlantic Steel factors. As to the first factor, the Board has con-
cluded that the place of discussion should weigh against NLRA protection 
where opprobrious or abusive comments are made in the presence of other em-
ployees.188 This factor, it seems, heavily weighs against the protection of social 
media posts. Especially given that the NLRA broadly defines employee as “in-
clud[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particu-
lar employer.”189 It is therefore difficult to envision a social media post that 
would qualify as falling outside the presence of other employees. 
As to the third factor, appellate review has rejected the Board’s suggestion 
that employees engaging in protected activity “could not be dismissed unless 
they were involved in flagrant, violent, or extreme behavior.”190 Consequently, 
where “an employee is fired for denouncing a supervisor in obscene, personal-
ly-denigrating, or insubordinate terms . . . then the nature of his outburst 
properly counts against according him the protection of the Act.”191 
The question then becomes one of how obscene, personally denigrating, or 
insubordinate behaviors should be defined. In a year where the tail end of the 
baby boomers are turning fifty and the leading edge of the millennials are run-
ning Fortune 500 companies,192 it is unlikely that a meaningful harmony of un-
derstanding exists between the NLRB, the employer, and the employee. In fact, 
employers who require the same level of maturity from millennial workers as 
was expected of them find it difficult to manage (or even understand) today’s 
workforce.193 What’s more, the rapid-fire, acerbic quality of many social media 
                                                        
187  Id. 
188  Felix Indus. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
189  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012). 
190  Felix Indus., 251 F.3d at 1055. 
191  Id. 
192  See, e.g., Shama Hyder, Study Reveals Surprising Facts About Millennials in the Work-
place, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/shamakabani/2013 
/12/05/study-reveals-surprising-facts-about-millennials-in-the-workplace/ (defining millen-
nials as those born in the 80’s and 90’s); Fortune’s 40 Under 40: 2013, FORTUNE, 
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/40-under-40/2013/full_list/ (last visited Oct. 
19, 2014). 
193  “Employers, coaches, teachers, and parents are ‘hunting’ for an elusive maturity that, 
frankly, is hard to find.” TIM ELMORE, ARTIFICIAL MATURITY: HELPING KIDS MEET THE 
CHALLENGE OF BECOMING AUTHENTIC ADULTS 2 (2012). “68% of corporate recruiters say 
that it is difficult for their organizations to manage millennials.” Hyder, supra note 192. 
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expressions reflects the reality of a generation that grew up in an age where 
feedback has always been instantaneous, public, and largely sarcastic. 
For the employer, protecting its brand from the hazards of insubordinate or 
malicious employee expressions, which have the potential to go viral with blaz-
ing speed, is a valid concern. In a world overexposed to information and under-
exposed to real-life experience, social media expressions can reflect infor-
mation rich convictions deprived of genuine understanding.194 Today’s em-
employees often suffer from a sort of “Google reflex”; the curse of which is 
that the speed at which data—devoid of experience—can be accessed has “par-
adoxically slowed down . . . actual maturity.”195 What is more, employees who 
have extensive social media networks and who are accustomed to high-speed 
information exchanges may experience a phenomenon that psychologists refer 
to as “high arrogance, low self-esteem.”196 These employees unconsciously 
present themselves as mean-spirited and self-absorbed.197 Their rapid-fire ex-
pressions motivated by little more than “a primitive impulse to respond” to the 
unremitting influx of texts, tweets, and Facebook updates.198 The resulting ex-
pressions—“bursts of information”—evidence the consequences of social me-
dia distraction: “low creativity, lack of focus, and an inability to be totally in 
the moment.”199 The danger of such expressions to an employer’s brand is pal-
pable, and where that expression grows from malicious or insubordinate ani-
mus, the NLRA must not serve as a shield for the attacking employee. 
The NLRB attempts to identify obscene, malicious, or insubordinate con-
duct by examining the tone of the employee’s expression. That examination of 
tone begins with an analysis of whether the employee’s behavior can be viewed 
as “public disparagement of the employer’s product or an undermining of its 
reputation.”200 It is not difficult to understand an employer’s desire to minimize 
the negative effects of these potentially brand-damaging statements. In spite of 
its goal to protect the flow of commerce from the negative effects of unfair la-
bor practices, the NLRB’s decisions tend to favor protecting employee expres-
sions. The resulting panoply of decisions is not easily applied to the over-
whelming reach of social media expressions. 
Those decisions favoring employee expression over employer reputation 
focus more on employee purpose than on employee tone. As a result, the way 
an employee communicates seems to carry less weight than whether the em-
ployee’s expression can be definitively linked to improving a condition of their 
                                                        
194  See ELMORE, supra note 193, at 4. 
195  Id.  
196  Id. at 20. 
197  Id. at 21. 
198  Id. at 26. 
199  Id. at 26–27. 
200  Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 229, 231 (1980) (quoting Veeder-Root Co., 237 
N.L.R.B 1175, 1177 (1978)). 
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employment. “[A]bsent a malicious motive, [an employee’s] right to appeal to 
the public is not dependent on the sensitivity of [the employer] to [the employ-
ee’s] choice of forum.”201 Furthermore, a “mocking and sarcastic tone,” with-
out more, is not sufficient to deprive an expression of the Act’s protection,202 
nor is the use of “satire and irony,” rather than “a more neutral factual recita-
tion of [employee] dissatisfaction.”203 The use of “unpleasantries uttered in the 
course of otherwise protected concerted activity do[es] not strip away the Act’s 
protection.”204 Thus, referring to supervisors as “a—hole[s]”205 and calling the 
company’s chief executive officer a “cheap son of a bitch”206 did not lose the 
Act’s protection.207 
Those decisions favoring employer reputation over employee expression, 
by contrast, focus on a disloyalty analysis. The Supreme Court articulated this 
disloyalty doctrine in 1953 when it upheld Jefferson Standard, an NLRB deci-
sion that legitimatized the discharge of employees who distributed handbills 
sharply critical of their employer.208 In so holding, the Court reasoned that 
Congress did not intend Section 7 to “weaken the underlying contractual bonds 
and loyalties of employer and employee.”209 The Court emphasized that “[t]he 
legal principle that insubordination, disobedience or disloyalty is adequate 
cause for discharge is plain enough.”210 While NLRB decisions since Jefferson 
Standard have increasingly broadened the employees’ right to criticize their 
employer, comments directed at third-parties may still lose protection if the 
motives are found to be disloyal.211 For instance, in Five Star Transportation, 
employee letters mailed to the school board characterized the employer as a 
“substandard company” that was “so reckless that they have employed alcohol 
abusers, drug offenders, child molesters, and persons that have had their license 
suspended.”212 In finding that these letters were unprotected, the court stated, 
“[i]t matters not whether the communications were true or false.”213 Although 
the Board recognized that the statements referenced a labor dispute, it did not 
                                                        
201  Richboro Cmty. Mental Health Council, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1267, 1268 (1979). 
202  Karl Knauz Motors, Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. No. 164, at 10 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
203  Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., 284 N.L.R.B. 442, 452 (1987) (employees authored a fake 
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204  Timekeeping Sys., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 244, 249 (1997). 
205  U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 389, 390 (1979). 
206  Groves Truck & Trailer, 281 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1194–95 (1986). 
207  See also Alcoa Inc., 352 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1225–26 (2008) (holding reference to supervi-
sor as an “egotistical fucker” protected); Stanford Hotel, 344 N.L.R.B. 558, 558–59 (2005) 
(holding the calling of supervisor a “liar and a bitch” and a “fucking son of a bitch” not so 
opprobrious as to cost the employee the protection of the Act). 
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210  Id. at 475. 
211  Sierra Publ’g Co. v. NLRB, 889 F.2d 210, 216 (9th Cir. 1989). 
212  Five Star Transp., Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. 42, 46 (2007). 
213  Id. 
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consider the reference strong enough to overcome the “inflammatory language” 
used by the employees “intended to damage the [employer’s] reputation.”214 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s summary of the state of the law in 1989 is 
remarkably cogent and supportive of non-malicious employee expressions re-
lated to improving the terms and conditions of employment. 
In summary, the disloyalty standard is at base a question of whether the em-
ployees’ efforts to improve their wages or working conditions through influenc-
ing strangers to the labor dispute were pursued in a reasonable manner under the 
circumstances. Product disparagement unconnected to the labor dispute, breach 
of important confidences, and threats of violence are clearly unreasonable ways 
to pursue a labor dispute. On the other hand, suggestions that a company’s 
treatment of its employees may have an effect upon the quality of the company’s 
products, or may even affect the company’s own viability are not likely to be 
unreasonable, particularly in cases when the addressees of the information are 
made aware of the fact that a labor dispute is in progress. Childish ridicule may 
be unreasonable, while heated rhetoric may be quite proper under the circum-
stances. Each situation must be examined on its own facts, but with an under-
standing that the law does favor a robust exchange of viewpoints.215 
These seemingly contradictory assessments of opprobrious conduct make 
the creation of a properly fashioned social media policy that bars personally 
denigrating and insubordinate comments an insufferable task. The difficulty is 
that there is very little an employer can do to insulate itself from public dispar-
agement of its products and services. Any social media policy that strives to 
restrict employees from posting potentially damaging expressions is unlikely to 
survive a challenge rooted in a properly coordinated, appropriately phrased at-
tack on terms and conditions of employment. It is important to note, however, 
that an appropriately phrased attack is more about semantics than temperament. 
The NLRB will likely consider an attack on an employer’s operations or man-
agement as protected, regardless of inflammatory language, so long as the ex-
pression links the non-malicious attack to the employee’s terms and conditions 
of employment. On the other hand, the NLRB will likely dismiss the very same 
grievance, regardless of conciliatory language, if the link is not conclusive. 
Consequently, the employer’s protection from damage to brand caused by the 
opprobrious conduct of its employees is tenuous at best. 
Employers today are justifiably baffled by the suggestions, the decisions, 
and the options. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Gilded Age, the extremes of industrialism exposed scores of laborers 
to grossly unfair labor practices. These laborers struggled to shine a light on 
their exploitation, but in those days, galvanizing the support necessary to affect 
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change was time-consuming, complicated, and expensive. Getting a message to 
a substantial audience required a printing press; getting a message to a national 
audience required a newspaper. This hurdle was difficult to overcome, as many 
of the large newspapers of this era were not sympathetic to organized labor’s 
message. With no other way to circulate a message to provoke change, the 
message failed to thrive. For these aggrieved laborers, there was no reprieve in 
the nation’s high regard for protected speech. After all, in these early days of 
the labor movement, “[f]reedom of the press [was] guaranteed only to those 
who own[ed] one.”216 
With enactment of the NLRA in 1935, employees for the first time had a 
mechanism which could secure their right to engage in concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. While 
the Act did not dictate terms and conditions of employment, or even compel 
employers to reach agreement with their employees, it did allow for legitimate 
use of the strike weapon. By protecting the right of laborers to organize and 
strike, the NLRA provided employees with a substantial mechanism to mitigate 
the inequality of bargaining power between employees and employers. Where 
these laborers lacked an effective method for eliciting public support through 
widespread distribution of their grievance, their newfound right to strike be-
came their most powerful weapon. “The strike plays the same role in labor ne-
gotiations that warfare plays in diplomatic negotiations. It facilitates agreement 
precisely because the consequences of failure are serious, unpleasant, and cost-
ly.”217 
In the seventy-eight years since enactment of the NLRA, organized labor 
campaigns have secured a variety of significant terms and conditions of em-
ployment. In fact, federal and state labor laws now compel many of these em-
ployment terms, and administrative agencies supervise their enforcement. Ad-
ditionally, in the seventy-eight years since enactment of the NLRA, 
technological advances have revolutionized the way information is shared, the 
way groups organize, and the way communities converse. Gone are the days 
where freedom of the press was only guaranteed to those who owned one. 
Where once few would argue whether the pen was mightier than the sword, to-
day, few should argue social media’s might. 
However, not all that glitters in the twenty-first century cloud is protected. 
The protection of an employee’s right to engage in concerted activities through 
social media is little more than an illusion; behind the curtain exists nothing 
more than a razor-thin barrier between protected speech and termination. While 
the NLRB has made clear that employer policies designed to regulate online 
expression must clearly exempt Section 7 activity from every provision, the re-
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ality is that employers must move beyond workplace policies so stuffed with 
examples and context that they have become too large to read. Social media us-
ers predisposed to communicating 140 characters at a time are not likely to 
read, or understand, such bloated hyperbole. 
The NLRB’s outdated interpretation of collective action encumbers the 
rights of both employees and employers. Employees seeking to improve the 
conditions of their employment should not be disadvantaged by the realities of 
twenty-first century expression and collaboration. At the same time, employers 
intent on protecting their business interests from the negative effects of brand-
shaping campaigns, orchestrated by disgruntled employees, should not be pre-
vented from implementing confidentiality and civility policies. 
The answer, it seems, is quite simple. Any employer policy that regulates 
the expressions of employees must begin by clearly defining protected Section 
7 activities, and then end by outlining the employer policies that regulate un-
protected activities. An SMP that focuses more on explaining Section 7 em-
ployee rights and less on cataloging the requisite examples of prohibited egre-
gious misconduct serves the needs of both employees and employers. Thus, the 
NLRB must consistently uphold policies that focus on informing employees of 
their protected Section 7 rights, and then steadfastly hold employees accounta-
ble for brand-shaping expressions that fall outside of those rights. 
The goal, after all, is to protect the flow of commerce from the negative ef-
fects of unfair labor practices; the goal is not to stifle commerce with incon-
sistent, unpredictable governance of social media expressions. 
